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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal stems from the consolidation of two actions 
filed in federal district court by the same plaintiffs--one in 
which diversity jurisdiction existed and one in which federal 
subject matter jurisdiction was lacking--and the 
subsequent dismissal of both actions for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. As an initial matter, we must determine 
whether a defendant in the diversity action has standing to 
appeal the dismissal of the suit against it. Because we hold 
that standing exists, we review the District Court's order 
dismissing the suit against the defendant and we will 
reverse that order. 
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I. 
 
Patricia Cella was injured by a ball-forming machine 
while working on February 21, 1996. On August 8, 1997, 
she and her husband ("the Cellas") filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against Togum Construction, Robert Bosch 
Corporation, Miltenberg & Santom, Inc., and Wiener, USA. 
In this action ("the first action"), the Cellas asserted state 
law claims including negligence, strict liability, breach of 
warranties of merchantability and fitness, and loss of 
consortium. Subject matter jurisdiction was appropriately 
predicated upon the complete diversity of the parties. On 
February 20, 1998, the Cellas filed a second action ("the 
second action") in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania arising out of the same 
accident, but instead naming as defendants AMCO 
Customs Brokerage, Robert E. Kehle, Elizabeth Lancaster, 
and Edward J. Strycharz. Although the complaint alleged 
that diversity jurisdiction existed in the second action as 
well, it was apparent from the face of the complaint that the 
Cellas and the defendant AMCO were Pennsylvania citizens. 
 
On March 16, 1998, the Cellas moved to consolidate the 
second action with the first action pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 42 and to have the District Court 
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the second 
action or, alternatively, "remand" the consolidated actions 
to state court. The District Court declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the second action since it determined that 
to do so would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional 
requirement of Section 1332. However, in an order dated 
April 14, 1998, the District Court consolidated the two 
actions and dismissed them without prejudice for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Upon dismissal, the consolidated cases proceeded in 
state court. Because Pennsylvania has a two-year statute of 
limitations for actions to recover damages for personal 
injury, see 42 Pa.C.S. S5524, the Cellas could not have 
initiated a new, identical state court action against Bosch 
on March 6, 1998, the date on which the Cellas filed their 
motion to consolidate and "remand" or dismiss. However, 
the Cellas were able to proceed against Bosch in state court 
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by operation of 42 Pa.C.S. S5103, entitled "Transfer of 
erroneously filed matters." Section 5103 provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
       (1) . . . In order to preserve a claim under Chapter 55 
       (relating to limitation of time), a litigant who timely 
       commences an action or proceeding in any United 
       States court for a district embracing any part of this 
       Commonwealth is not required to commence a 
       protective action in a court or before a district justice 
       of this Commonwealth. Where a matter is filed in any 
       United States court for a district embracing any part of 
       this Commonwealth and the matter is dismissed by the 
       United States court for lack of jurisdiction, any litigant 
       in the matter filed may transfer the matter to a court 
       or magisterial district of this Commonwealth by 
       complying with the transfer provisions set forth in 
       paragraph (2). 
 
        (2) Except as otherwise prescribed by general rules, 
       or by order of the United States court, such transfer 
       may be effected by filing a certified transcript of the 
       final judgment of the United States court and the 
       related pleadings in a court or magisterial district of 
       this Commonwealth. 
 
See 42 Pa.C.S. S5103 (b)(1) and (2) (emphasis added). 
 
On this appeal, the Robert Bosch Corporation ("Bosch"), 
a defendant named in the first action, seeks to challenge 
the District Court's dismissal of the suit against it for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
II. 
 
Our threshold inquiry is whether Bosch has standing to 
appeal the dismissal of the federal suit against it. The 
Supreme Court has enunciated a three-part test to 
determine when a litigant has "standing" to invoke the 
power of a federal court. The party must allege (1) an injury 
in fact, (2) that is "fairly traceable" to the challenged action, 
and (3) that will be redressed by a favorable decision. See 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The Supreme 
Court has noted the following policy regarding standing to 
appeal: 
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       Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or 
       order of a district court may exercise the statutory 
       right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that 
       he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the 
       judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it. 
 
Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 
(1980). 
 
In this case, it appears at first glance that Bosch is not 
"aggrieved" by the order of the District Court, as that order 
dismisses the action against it. The corporation has in a 
sense received "all that [it] has sought" because it is no 
longer required to defend the case and is therefore no 
longer potentially subject to liability. However, this "first 
glance" analysis ignores the fact that the corporation is not 
now completely free from suit but rather is required to 
defend this suit in state rather than federal court. While 
injury in fact typically denotes a substantive harm, the 
Supreme Court has recognized "procedural injury" related 
to a change in forum in at least one instance. See 
International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of 
Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991) (holding that 
plaintiff had standing to challenge defendant's removal of 
their suit since they lost the right to sue in state court, the 
forum of their choice). While International Primate involved 
deprivation of a plaintiff's, rather than a defendant's, 
legitimate expectation of being able to litigate in a 
particular forum, it does demonstrate that this type of 
deprivation can be sufficient to render an appellant 
aggrieved. See also Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1164 
(4th Cir. 1996) (according "the party aggrieved concept" a 
practical rather than hypertechnical meaning and noting 
that "[a] party may be aggrieved by a district court decision 
that adversely affects its legal rights or position vis-a-vis 
other parties in the case or other potential litigants"). 
 
In the instant case, Bosch had no legitimate expectation 
before it was sued that it would be able to litigate the 
Cellas' claims against it in a federal court. The Cellas could 
have chosen to file suit against Bosch in state court 
originally and could have named non-diverse defendants in 
the same suit, thereby eliminating the possibility of 
removal. However, the Cellas chose to file suit against 
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Bosch and other diverse defendants in federal court under 
28 U.S.C. S1332. Once the Pennsylvania statute of 
limitations had run against the asserted claims as of 
February 21, 1998, the Cellas were left with no choice but 
to proceed--if they chose to proceed at all--in federal court. 
Accordingly, as of that time, Bosch acquired an expectation 
that it would be able to litigate the Cellas' claims against it 
in federal court, the forum of its choice. 
 
This expectation was subsequently frustrated by the 
District Court's dismissal order. Without this order, the 
Cellas would have had no basis for invoking 42 Pa.C.S. 
S 5103(b), the statute under which they "transferred" the 
actions to the state court, against Bosch. This statute, by 
its express terms, serves to toll the statute of limitations 
only for those claims that have been dismissed by a federal 
court for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order from which 
Bosch appeals divested Bosch of a previously viable statute 
of limitations defense in a Pennsylvania state proceeding 
and thereby deprived him of a legitimate expectation of 
being able to litigate the Cellas' claims in the federal court. 
 
Since this deprivation was caused by the District Court's 
order and since this Court can remedy that deprivation by 
reversing the dismissal order upon which the "transfer" was 
predicated, we hold that Bosch has standing to appeal. 
 
III. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
       (a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common 
       question of law or fact are pending before the court, it 
       may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the 
       matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the 
       actions consolidated; and it may make such orders 
       concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid 
       unnecessary costs or delay. 
 
Interpreting the predecessor to Rule 42(a), the Supreme 
Court stated that "consolidation is permitted as a matter of 
convenience and economy in administration, but does not 
merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of 
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the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit 
parties in another." Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 
479, 496-97 (1933). As this Court has previously 
recognized, "Johnson remains the `authoritative' statement 
on the law of consolidation." Newfound Management Corp. 
v. Lewis, 131 F.3d 108, 116 (3d Cir. 1997); see also 9 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,S2382, at 
430 (2d ed. 1995). Thus, while a consolidation order may 
result in a single unit of litigation, such an order does not 
create a single case for jurisdiction purposes. 
 
In Bradgate Associates v. Fellows, Read & Associates, 
999 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1993), the district court had 
consolidated two lawsuits, one originally filed in federal 
court and one filed in state court but removed to the federal 
forum. Both cases had been filed by the same plaintiff 
against the same defendant. Upon finding an absence of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the district court remanded 
both cases to the state court. See id. at 748-49. This Court 
reversed on the ground that the district court's treatment of 
the consolidated cases as a single unit diminished the 
rights of the defendant. See id. at 751. While 28 U.S.C. 
S 1447(c)1 requires a district court to remand a case 
originally filed in state court but improperly removed to 
federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h)(3)2 
directs a district court to dismiss a case originally filed in 
federal court for which it lacks jurisdiction. By "remanding" 
the suit originally filed in federal court to state court, we 
held that the district court improperly prolonged litigation 
over claims that should have been dismissed. See id. 
 
Similarly, in this case, the District Court's "remand" 
order treated the consolidated actions as having been 
merged into one case and improperly altered the rights of 
Bosch. As noted above, the consolidation order did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1447(c) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f at any time 
before 
final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. S1447(c). 
 
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) states that "[w]henever it 
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). 
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result in the joinder of the defendants in the second action 
to the first action; rather each action retained its own 
separate identity. See Johnson, 289 U.S. at 496-97; Stacey 
v. Charles J. Rodgers, Inc., 756 F.2d 440, 442 (6th Cir. 
1985). Thus, the District Court should have analyzed the 
jurisdictional basis of each action independently. See Cole 
v. Schenly Industries, Inc., 563 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 
Because the complaint in the second action filed by the 
Cellas plainly indicated a lack of complete diversity, the 
District Court properly dismissed that action pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). However, complete 
diversity of citizenship existed--and continued to exist even 
after consolidation--in the first action involving Bosch. See 
Webb v. Just in Time, Inc., 769 F.Supp. 993, 996 (E.D. 
Mich. 1991) (holding that the court should determine 
presence or absence of diversity jurisdiction by analyzing 
each case separately even though cases had been 
consolidated); In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts 
Asbestos Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 538, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(holding that diversity jurisdiction over an action was not 
destroyed by consolidation of that action with a second 
action brought by a plaintff who was a citizen of the same 
state as a defendant in the diversity action). Thus, the 
District Court should have allowed the first action to 
proceed to the merits. 
 
Consequently, we will reverse the District Court's order 
dismissing the first action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and will remand with instructions to retain 
jurisdiction over that action. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
 
I dissent because I do not believe that Bosch has 
standing to challenge the District Court's dismissal order. 
In my view, Bosch has not demonstrated that it was 
"aggrieved" by the District Court's order that dismissed 
Cellas' entire federal suit against it. I simply cannot ignore 
the fact that after the District Court issued the order 
dismissing the Cellas' claims Bosch walked out of the 
courtroom completely free from suit. Bosch's grief arises 
solely because Pennsylvania law gives Cella a cause of 
action in this situation. 
 
The Supreme Court has indeed recognized that 
procedural injury relating to choice of forum may create 
standing. See International Primate Protection League v. 
Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77-78, 
111 S. Ct. 1700, 1704-05 (1991) (holding that denial of a 
plaintiff's right to choose a forum was a sufficient injury to 
support standing). Nonetheless, it is my belief that, for a 
party to have standing to appeal the dismissal, the 
procedural injury must be caused more directly by an order 
of the District Court. As the majority notes, 
 
       Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or 
       order of a district court may exercise the statutory 
       right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that 
       he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the 
       judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it. 
 
Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333, 100 
S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (1980). 
 
Here, Bosch received all the relief it could reasonably 
have sought in the District Court -- the case against it was 
entirely dismissed.1 The fact that Bosch was then faced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Bosch argues that, once the Pennsylvania statute of limitations ran, it 
acquired an "expectation" that it would be able to defend against the 
claims in the District Court. It argues that the District's Court's 
frustration of this expectation supports standing. I see two problems 
with this expectation. First, it is hard for me to see how Bosch can 
complain that its "expectation" that it would be able to defend in federal 
court was frustrated when the case was dismissed entirely. Bosch had 
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Bosch was aggrieved, if at all, not by the District Court's 
order, but by the independent operation of the 
Pennsylvania statute. Bosch's arguments regarding that 
statute are more appropriately directed to the Pennsylvania 
courts or the legislature that enacted the savings statute. 
We flex the concept of standing too far when we say that a 
defendant has been aggrieved by a District Court order that 
dismissed all charges against it. Therefore, because I do not 
think that Bosch has standing to challenge the District 
Court's decision, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the 
majority opinion.2 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
no right to defend the case in federal court, and could certainly not have 
complained had the Cellas voluntarily withdrawn the case and refiled in 
state court. 
 
Second, the "expectation" that it would be able to defend was not a 
right, and any expectation it had was tempered by the fact that 
Pennsylvania law provided that, if the case was dismissed because of 
some defect in the subject matter jurisdiction, Bosch would again be 
subject to suit in state court. "Expectations" must take into account all 
possibilities. 
 
2. My dissent is limited to Part II. If Bosch has standing to appeal a 
favorable judgment, I agree that the District Court clearly erred in 
granting it. 
with a suit in Pennsylvania state court does not change this 
reality. 
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